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ABSTRACT
Because minorities typically fare poorly on standardized tests, job testing is thought to pose an equity-efficiency
trade-off: testing improves selection but reduces minority hiring. We develop a conceptual framework
to assess when this tradeoff is likely to apply and evaluate the evidence for such a trade-off using data
from a national retail firm whose 1,363 stores switched from informal to test-based worker screening
over the course of on year. We document that testing yielded more productive hires at this firm -- raising
median tenure by 10-plus percent. Consistent with prior research, minorities performed worse on the
test. Yet, testing had no measurable impact on minority hiring, and productivity gains were uniformly
large among minorities and non-minorities. These results suggest that job testing raised the precision
of screening without introducing additional negative information about minority applicants, most plausibly
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In the early twentieth century, the majority of unskilled, industrial employees in the United States
w e r eh i r e dw i t hn os y s t e m a t i ce ﬀorts at selection [Wilk and Cappelli, 2003]. Sanford Jacoby’s well-
known industrial relations text describes an early 20th century Philadelphia factory at which foremen
tossed apples into crowds of job-seekers, and hired the men who caught them [Jacoby, 1985, p. 17].
These hiring practices are no longer commonplace. During the 1980s, as much as one-third of large
employers adopted systematic skills testing for job applicants [Bureau of National Aﬀairs, 1980 and
1988]. But skills testing has remained rare in hiring for hourly wage jobs, where training investments
are typically modest and employment spells brief [Aberdeen, 2001]. Due to advances in information
technology, these practices are poised for change. With increasing prevalence, employers use com-
puterized job applications and assessments to administer and score personality tests, perform online
background checks and guide hiring decisions. Over time, these tools are likely to become increasingly
sophisticated, as for example has occurred in the consumer credit industry.
Widespread use of job testing has the potential to raise aggregate productivity by improving the
quality of matches between workers and ﬁrms. But there is a pervasive concern, reﬂected in public
policy, that job testing may have adverse distributional consequences, commonly called ‘disparate
impacts.’ Because of the near universal ﬁnding that minorities, less-educated and low socioeconomic-
status individuals fare relatively poorly on standardized tests [Neal and Johnson, 1996; Jencks and
Phillips, 1998], job testing is thought to pose a trade oﬀ between eﬃciency and equality; better
candidate selection comes at a cost of reduced opportunity for groups with lower average test scores
[Hartigan and Wigdor, 1989; Hunter and Schmidt, 1982]. This concern is forcefully articulated by
Hartigan and Wigdor in the introduction to their inﬂuential National Academy of Sciences Report,
Fairness in Employment Testing (p. vii):
“What is the appropriate balance between anticipated productivity gains from better em-
ployee selection and the well-being of individual job seekers? Can equal employment oppor-
tunity be said to exist if screening methods systematically ﬁlter out very large proportions
of minority candidates?”
Nor is this expression of concern merely rhetorical. Hartigan and Wigdor recommend that the U.S.
Employment Service apply race-conscious score adjustments to the General Aptitude Testing Battery
(GATB) to limit harm to minorities–despite their conclusion that the GATB is not race biased.
This presumed trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and equality has garnered substantial academic, legal
and regulatory attention, including speciﬁc provisions in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 gov-
1erning the use of employment tests,1 several Equal Employment Opportunity Commission guidelines
regulating employee selection procedures [U.S. Department of Labor, 1978],2 and two National Acad-
emy of Sciences studies evaluating the eﬃcacy and fairness of job testing [Hartigan and Wigdor, 1989;
Wigdor and Green, 1991]. Despite this substantial body of research and policy, the case for a trade-oﬀ
between equality and eﬃciency in the use of job testing is not well-established empirically–nor, as
this paper argues, is it well-grounded conceptually.
We start from the presumption that competitive employers face a strong incentive to assess worker
productivity accurately, but such assessments are inevitably imperfect. In our discussion and con-
ceptual model, we consider two distinct–and not mutually exclusive–channels by which job testing
may aﬀect worker assessment. The ﬁrst is to raise the precision of screening, which occurs if testing
improves the accuracy of ﬁrms’ assessments of applicant productivity. A large body of research demon-
strates the eﬃcacy of job testing for improving precision, so we view this channel as well-established.3
The second is to ‘change beliefs’–that is, to introduce information that systematically deviates from
ﬁrms’ assessments of applicant productivity based on informal interviews. This occurs if either the job
test is biased or if the informal screen that precedes it is biased–or, potentially, if both are biased,
albeit diﬀerently.
To see the relevance of these distinctions, consider a ﬁrm that is initially screening informally for
worker productivity and which introduces a formal job test that improves the precision of screening.
Assuming that minority applicants perform signiﬁcantly worse than majority applicants on this test,
will the gain in screening precision come at a cost of reduced minority hiring? As we show below, the
answer will generally be no if both the informal screen and the formal test provide unbiased measures
of applicant productivity. In this case, the main eﬀect of testing will be to raise the precision of
screening within each applicant group; shifts in hiring for or against minority applicants are likely
to be small and will favor minorities. Notably, this result does not require that both the test and
informal screen are unbiased. Our model below suggests that the harm or beneﬁt to minority workers
from testing depends primarily on the relative biases of the formal and informal screens. So long as
1See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, Section 703(h).
2The EEOC’s Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Criteria [1978] introduces the “Four Fifths” rule, which
states (Section 4d), “A selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-ﬁrths (4/5) (or eighty
p e r c e n t )o ft h er a t ef o rt h eg r o u pw i t ht h eh i g h e s tr a t ew i l lgenerally be regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies
as evidence of adverse impact.”
3In an exhaustive assessment, Wigdor and Green [1991] ﬁnd that military recruits’ scores on the Armed Forces
Qualiﬁcation Test (AFQT) accurately predict their performance on objective measures of job proﬁciency. Similarly,
based on an analysis of 800 studies, Hartigan and Wigdor [1989] conclude that the General Aptitude Test Battery
(GATB), used by the U.S. Employment Service to refer job searchers to private sector employers, is a valid predictor
of job performance across a broad set of occupations. Most relevant to this study, the consensus of the personnel
psychology literature is that commonly administered personality tests based on the “ﬁve factor model” are signiﬁcant
predictors of employee job proﬁciency across almost all occupational categories [Barrick and Mount, 1991; Tett, Jackson
and Rothstein,1991; Goodstein and Lanyon, 1999].
2the information provided by job tests about minority applicants is not systematically more negative
than ﬁrms’ beliefs derived from informal screens, job testing has the potential to raise productivity
without a disparate impact on minority hiring. This result makes it immediately apparent why the
presumption that job testing will harm minority workers is suspect: there is little reason to expect
that job testing is more minority-biased than informal hiring practices.4
This discussion, and our conceptual model, suggest that the presumed trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency
and equality in hiring is an empirical possibility rather than a theoretical certainty. Evaulation of
the evidence for this trade-oﬀ requires a comparison of the hiring and productivity of similar workers
hired by comparable employers with and without the use of employment testing. There is to our
knowledge no prior research that performs this comparison.5 In this paper, we empirically evaluate
the consequences of private sector job testing for minority employment and productivity by studying
the experience of a large, geographically dispersed retail ﬁrm whose 1,363 establishments switched
from an informal, paper-based screening process to a computer-supported, test-based screening process
over a one year period. Both hiring methods use face-to-face interviews, while the test-based method
also places substantial weight on a personality test that is administered and scored by computer. We
use the rollout of this technology over a twelve month period to contrast contemporaneous changes in
productivity and minority hiring at establishments diﬀering only in the date that employment tests
were introduced at their sites.
We ﬁnd strong evidence that testing yielded more productive hires–increasing mean and median
employee tenure by 10 to 12 percent. Consistent with a large body of work, we ﬁnd that minority
applicants performed signiﬁcantly worse than majority applicants on the employment test. Had the
test changed employers’ beliefs about the average productivity of minority relative to majority appli-
cants, our model suggests that testing would have raised White hiring at the expense of Black hiring
and reduced the substantial productivity gap between Black and White workers. Neither of these
eﬀects occurred; the racial composition of hires was unchanged by testing and productivity gains were
uniformly large among both minority and majority hires.
In light of our theoretical model, these results imply that the job test was unbiased relative to the
informal screen it supplemented. Testing therefore raised productivity by improving selection within
minority and majority applicant pools rather than by shifting the distribution of employment towards
the higher scoring group (White applicants). By performing a parametric simulation of the conceptual
4In practice, there is considerable evidence that employers favor majority over minority workers when interviewing
and hiring, suggesting the presence of taste-based or statistical discrimination or both [Altonji and Blank, 1999; Goldin
and Rouse, 2000; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004].
5All prior studies of which we are aware compare anticipated or actual hiring outcomes using an employment test to
a hypothetical case in which, absent testing, ﬁrms do not already account for majority/minority productivity diﬀerences.
3model using the observed data on test scores, hiring and productivity, we reach a stronger conclusion:
the lack of relative bias demonstrated by our results is most plausibly explained by a lack of absolute
bias. That is, we accept the hypothesis that both the informal screen and job test were unbiased.
Our research contributes to the inﬂuential literature on testing, race and employment in three
respects. First, despite substantial regulatory concern about the possible adverse consequences of
job testing for minority hiring, we are unaware of any work that empirically evaluates whether use
of job testing in a competitive hiring environment harms (or beneﬁts) minority workers. Second,
whereas the bulk of the prior literature on job testing focuses on the U.S. military and other public
sector agencies, we study the experience and personnel data of a large, for-proﬁt retail enterprise as it
introduces job testing. Since incentives and constraints are likely to diﬀer between public and private
sector employers, we believe this makes the ﬁndings particularly useful. A ﬁnal unusual feature of our
research is that we look beyond the hiring impacts of job testing to evaluate its consequences for the
productivity of hires (as measured by job spell durations), both overall and by race. As our conceptual
model underscores, these two outcomes–hiring and productivity–are theoretically closely linked and
hence provide complementary evidence on the consequences of job testing for employee selection.
Most closely related to our work is a study by Holzer, Raphael and Stoll [2006], which ﬁnds that
employers that initiate criminal background checks for job applicants are more likely to hire minority
workers than those who do not. Holzer et al. conclude that absent criminal background checks,
employers statistically discriminate against Black applicants. Like these authors, we ﬁnd that improved
job applicant information–here, job tests–did not harm minority applicants, despite the fact that
minority applicants perform worse than majority applicants on the hiring screen. Relative to prior
work, a key virtue of our study is that it exploits the phased rollout of job testing across numerous sites
belonging to the same ﬁrm to potentially eliminate any unmeasured confounds between sites’ screening
practices and their preferences towards hiring minority workers. The analysis is therefore likely to
provide a credible test of the ceteris paribus impact of testing on minority hiring and productivity.6
Prior to the analysis, it is important to clarify the provenance of our data and address questions
about the constraints under which the research was performed. The data analyzed for this study were
provided to the ﬁrst author by Unicru, Inc. (now a subsidiary of Kronos, Inc.) under a non-disclosure
agreement with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. This agreement placed no constraints on
the conclusions of the analysis except that they be factually accurate. Among numerous potential
ﬁrms available for analysis, the ﬁrm studied in this article was selected by the ﬁrst author because
its phased rollout of job testing across company sites oﬀered a compelling research design. Unicru
6Close in spirit to our study, though answering a distinct question, is Angrist [1993], which demonstrates that
successive increases in the military’s AFQT qualiﬁcation standard reduced minority enlistment.
4personnel had not previously analyzed the ﬁrm’s data to evaluate the eﬀect of job testing on the racial
distribution of hiring or productivity. All data used for the analysis were obtained from Unicru’s data
warehouse, which contains archives of personnel data for client ﬁrms. Consent for use of these data
was not required or requested from the ﬁrm studied. After the analysis was complete and the ﬁrst
draft of the paper was in circulation in January 2004, personnel managers of the ﬁrm were briefed on
the study and interviewed about the ﬁrm’s personnel policies before and after the implementation of
job testing.
The paper proceeds as follows. The subsequent section describes our data and details the ﬁrm’s
hiring procedures before and after the introduction of testing. Section III oﬀers a theoretical model
that illustrates how the possible disparate impacts of job testing depend critically on both the test’s
precision and its bias relative to the informal screens it supplements. Sections IV and V provide our
empirical analysis of the consequences of testing for productivity and hiring. Section VI synthesizes
and interprets these ﬁndings by benchmarking them against a parametric simulation of the theoretical
model applied to the observed applicant, hiring and productivity database. Section VII concludes.
II Informal and test-based applicant screening at a service sector
ﬁrm
We analyze the application, hiring, and employment outcome data of a large, geographically dispersed
service sector ﬁrm with outlets in 47 continental U.S. states. Our data include all 1,363 outlets of this
ﬁrm operating during our sample period. All sites are company-owned, each employing approximately
10 to 20 workers in line positions and oﬀering near-identical products and services. Line positions
account for approximately 75 percent of total (non-headquarters) employment, and a much larger
share of hiring. Line job responsibilities include checkout, inventory, stocking, and general customer
assistance. These tasks are comparable at each store, and most line workers perform all of them. Line
workers are primarily young, ages 18 through 30, and many hold their jobs for short durations. As is
s h o w ni nt h eﬁrst panel of Table I, approximately 70 p e r c e n to fh i r e sa r eW h i t e ,19 percent are Black
(non-Hispanic), and 12 percent are Hispanic.7 Median duration of completed job spells of line workers
is 99 days, and the corresponding mean is 174 days (panel B).
A Worker screening before and after use of job tests
Prior to June 1999, hiring procedures at this ﬁrm were informal, as is typical for this industry and
job type. Workers applied for jobs by completing brief, paper application forms, available from store
7These ﬁgures pertain to the ﬂow of workers. Since Whites at this ﬁrm typically have longer job spells than minorities,
they will be over-represented among the stock of workers relative to the ﬂow of hires.
5employees. If the store had an opening or a potential hiring need, the store manager would typically
phone the applicant for a job interview and make a hiring decision shortly thereafter.
Commencing in June of 1999, the ﬁrm began rolling out electronic application kiosks provided by
Unicru, Inc. By June of 2000, all stores in our sample were equipped with the technology. At the
kiosk, applicants complete a questionnaire administered by a screen-phone or computer terminal, or
in a minority of cases, by a web-based application. Like the paper application form, the electronic
questionnaire gathers information on demographics and prior experience. In addition, applicants sign
a release authorizing a criminal background check and a search of records in a commercial retail
oﬀender database.
A major component of the electronic application process is a computer-administered personality
test, which contains 100 items and takes approximately 20 minutes to complete. This test measures
ﬁve personality attributes that collectively constitute the ‘Five Factor’ model: conscientiousness, agree-
ableness, extroversion, openness and neuroticism. These factors are widely viewed by psychologists
as core personality traits [Digman, 1990; Wiggins, 1996]. The particular test instrument used by this
ﬁrm focuses on three of the ﬁve traits–conscientiousness, agreeableness and extroversion–which have
been found by a large industrial psychology literature to be eﬀective predictors of worker productiv-
ity, training proﬁciency, and tenure [Barrick and Mount, 1991; Tett, Jackson, and Rothstein, 1991;
Goodstein and Lanyon, 1999].8
Once the electronic application is completed, the data are sent to Unicru for automated processing.
The results are transmitted to the store’s manager by web-posting, email or fax. Two types of output
are provided. One is a document summarizing the applicant’s contact information, demographics,
employment history and work availability. This is roughly a facsimile of the conventional paper
application form. Second is a ‘Hiring Report’ that recommends speciﬁc interview questions and
highlights potential problem areas with the application, such as criminal background or self-reported
prior drug test failure. Of greatest interest, the report provides the applicant’s computed customer
service test score percentile ranking, along with a color code denoting the following score ranges: lowest
quartile (‘red’), second-to-lowest quartile (‘yellow’), and two highest quartiles (‘green’).
Following the employment test, hiring proceeds largely as before. Store managers choose whether
to oﬀer an interview (sometimes before the applicant has left the store) and, ultimately, whether to
oﬀer a job. Managers are strongly discouraged from hiring ﬁrst quartile (‘red’) applicants, and, as is
shown in Table II, fewer than 1 percent of hires are from this group. Figure I shows that hiring rates
8An identical paper and pencil personality test could have been used prior to the introduction of computer-supported
applicant screening. The cost of administering and scoring this paper and pencil test may have made it unattractive,
however.
6are strongly increasing in the test score in all deciles (see also panel c of Table II).9 The low hiring rate
observed in the data–only one in 11 applicants is hired–in part reﬂects the fact that applications are
submitted continually while vacancies open only occasionally. For the typical store in our sample with
15 line positions and mean tenure of 173 days, we would expect approximately 28 job applications per
month for 2 to 3 vacancies.
B Hiring and termination data
The primary data source for our analysis is company personnel records containing worker demographics
(gender, race), date of hire, and termination date and termination reason for each worker hired during
t h es a m p l ef r a m e .W eu s et h e s ed a t at om e a s u r ep r e - post changes in hiring and productivity by store
following the introduction of testing. We calculate length of service for all employment spells in our
sample, 98 percent of which are completed by the close of the sample. In addition, we utilize data
on applicant’s self-reported gender, race (White, Black, Hispanic), zip code of self-reported residence
and zip code of the store to which they applied.10 We merge these zip codes to data from the 2000
U.S. Census of Populations Summary Files 1 and 3 [U.S. Census Bureau, 2001 and 2003] to obtain
information on the racial composition and median household income of each applicant’s residence and
each store’s location.
A critical feature of our research database is that employment (but not application) records are
available for workers hired prior to implementation of the Unicru system at each store.11 Hence, we
build a sample that includes all line workers hired from January 1999, ﬁve months prior to the ﬁrst
Unicru rollout, through May 2000, when all stores had gone online. After dropping observations in
which applicants had incompletely reported gender or race, we were left with 33,924 workers hired
into line positions, 25,561 of whom were hired without use of testing and 8,363 of whom were hired
after receiving the test.12
Notably absent from our data are standard human capital variables such as age, education and
earnings. Because most line workers at this ﬁrm are relatively young and many have not yet completed
9Our data do not distinguish between an applicant who is not oﬀered a job and an applicant who declines a job oﬀer.
The observed hiring rate is therefore a lower bound on the oﬀer rate.
10A small share of workers (0.9 percent) is classiﬁed as ‘other’ race. We exclude these workers because of a concern
that the ‘other’ race category was not consistently coded before and after the introduction of job testing. The working
paper version of this manuscript [Autor and Scarborough, 2004] contains complete results that include the ‘other’ race
category. These results are nearly identical.
11Unicru imports its clients’ personnel data into its own computer systems to produce performance evaluations. A
by-product of this practice is that Unicru often obtains personnel data for workers hired prior to the implementation of
the Unicru system. This is the case with the ﬁrm studied here.
12We closed the sample at the point when all hires at this ﬁrm were made through the Unicru system. Because the
rollout accelerated during the ﬁnal three of twelve months, the majority of hires during the rollout period are non-tested
hires. Twenty-ﬁve percent of the hires in our sample are made prior to the ﬁrst rollout.
7schooling, we are not particularly concerned about the absence of demographic variables. The omission
of wage data is potentially a greater concern. Our understanding, however, is that wages for line jobs
are largely set centrally and that the majority of these positions pay the minimum wage. We therefore
suspect that controlling for year and month of hire, as is done in all models, should purge much of the
unobserved wage variation in the data.
C Applicant test scores
To analyze test score diﬀerences in our sample, we draw on an applicant database containing all White,
Black and Hispanic applications (189,067 total) submitted to the 1,363 stores in our sample during
the one year following the rollout of job testing (June 2000 through May 2001). This secondary data
source is not linked to our primary research sample and is collected exclusively after the rollout of
testing was completed. Although we would ideally analyze paper and electronic applications submitted
during the rollout, these were not retained. In Section IV, we demonstrate that test scores from
the applicant database are strongly correlated with the productivity of workers hired at each store
before the introduction of employment testing, suggesting that this database provides an informative
characterization of workers applying for job during the rollout period.
Table II shows that there are marked diﬀerences in the distribution of standardized (i.e., mean zero,
variance one) test scores among White, Black and Hispanic applicants. Kernel density comparisons
of test scores in Figure II underscore the pervasiveness of these diﬀerences. Relative to the White
test score distribution, the Black and Hispanic test score densities are visibly left-shifted. These racial
gaps, equal to 0.19 and 0.12 standard deviations, accord closely with the representative test data
reported by Goldberg et al. [1998].13 To examine whether these race diﬀerences are explained by
other observable, non-race attributes of test-takers, we report in Table III a set of descriptive OLS
models in which individual test scores of job applicants are regressed on all the major covariates in
our database including race, gender, year and month of application, indicator variables for each of
the 1,363 stores in the sample, state speciﬁc time trends, and measures of the median log income
and percent non-White in the applicant’s zip-code of residence. Conditional on these detailed control
variables, race gaps in test scores are 60 to 75 percent as large as the unconditional diﬀerences and
are highly signiﬁcant, suggesting that the job test conveys information about applicants that is not
fully proxied by observable characteristics.
13Using a representative sample of the U.S. workforce, Goldberg et al. [1998] ﬁnd that conditional on age, education
and gender, blacks and Hispanics score, respectively, 0.22 and 0.18 standard deviations below whites on the conscientious
trait. Blacks also score lower on extroversion and Hispanics lower on agreeableness (in both cases signiﬁcant), but these
discrepancies are smaller in magnitude.
8I I I W h e nd o e sj o bt e s t i n gp o s ea ne q u a l i t y - e ﬃciency trade-oﬀ?
Prior to analyzing the eﬀect of testing on hiring and productivity at this ﬁrm, we provide a conceptual
framework to explore when job testing is likely to pose an equality-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ.W e d e ﬁne
an equality-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ as a case where the productivity gains from testing come at a cost
of reduced minority hiring. Our conceptual framework is related to well known models of statistical
discrimination by Phelps [1972], Aigner and Cain [1977], Lundberg and Startz [1984], Coate and Loury
[1993] and Altonji and Pierret [2001]. The contribution of our analysis is to explore how the impact
of job testing on the employment opportunities and productivity (conditional on hire) of minority
and majority workers depends on the discrepancy between ﬁrms’ prior information about population
parameters–based on job interviews and other established hiring practices (brieﬂy ‘interviews’)–and
the information provided by job tests. We refer to the discrepancy between tests and interviews as
the relative bias of tests.
Our analysis yields three main results: (1) if job tests are relatively unbiased (i.e., relative to
interviews), they do not pose an equality-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ;t h a ti s ,t h ee ﬃciency gains from testing
come at no cost in reduced minority hiring; (2) if j o bt e s t sa r eb i a s - r e d u c i n g –that is, they mitigate
existing biases–eﬃciency gains accrue in part from reduced hiring of groups favored by pre-existing
(i.e., interview) biases; thus, minority hiring is reduced if pre-existing biases favor minorities, and so
an equality-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ is present; (3) if job tests are bias-enhancing–that is, they increase the
extent of bias–testing raises the hiring of groups favored by the test but does not necessarily increase
eﬃciency. We present the model and its main conclusions below. Proofs of selected propositions are
found in the Appendix, with detailed proofs of all propositions available from the authors.
A The environment, timing and distributional assumptions
There are many ﬁrms facing numerous job applicants from two identiﬁable demographic groups, x1
and x2, corresponding to a majority and minority group. For simplicity, assume that each group
comprises half of the applicant population (thus, ‘minority’ refers to historical circumstances rather
than population frequency).
The ability (Y ) of job candidates is distributed as
Y ∼ N (μ0 (x),1/h0).
The mean parameter μ0 (x) may depend on x. Assume that h0, equal to the inverse of the population
variance σ2
0, is constant, independent of x.14 Let the ability of each applicant, y, be a random draw
from the population distribution for the relevant demographic group (x1 or x2). The ﬁrm treats the
14The assumption that σ
2
0 is independent of x stands in contrast to several models of statistical discrimination in
9population parameters as known. Thus, the ﬁrm’s prior distribution for a draw y is the population
distribution.
Firms have a linear, constant returns to scale production technology and are risk neutral. Workers
produce output, f (y)=y. Hence, ability and productivity are synonymous. Job spell durations are
independent of y and wages are ﬁxed,15 so ﬁrms strictly prefer to hire more productive workers.
Job applicants are drawn at random from the pooled distribution of x1 and x2 workers. Firms
hire applicants using a screening threshold where applicants whose expected productivity exceeds
a speciﬁed value are hired. In a fully elaborated search framework, this screening threshold would
depend on technology and labor market conditions. In our reduced form setup, the screening threshold
is chosen so that the aggregate hiring rate is held constant at K ∈ (0,0.5). This simpliﬁcation
focuses our analysis on the ﬁrst-order impacts of job testing on the distribution of hiring across
demographic groups, holding total employment ﬁxed. We additionally assume that the hiring rate of
each demographic group is below 50 percent, so selection is from the right-hand tail of each applicant
distribution.
Initially, applicants are screened using interviews. Each interview generates an interview signal, η.
When testing is introduced, applicants are screened using both interviews and tests. The test score is
denoted by s.
Suppose that there is no bias in interviews. Then the distribution of interview signals will be
centered on the true productivity of each applicant. Precisely,
(1) η ∼ N (y,1/hη),
where hη is the inverse of the variance of the interview signal (a measure of accuracy of the interview).
Assume hη does not depend on x.
Conditional on perceived productivity μ0 (x) for group x and the interview signal η,t h eﬁrm
updates its assessment of the expected productivity of the applicant:
(2) m(x,η) ≡ y|x,η ∼ N (μ(x,η),1/hI),
where the updated degree of precision equals hI ≡ hη + h0, and the updated mean equals μ(x,η) ≡
[ηhη + μ0 (x)h0]/hI.
which testing is diﬀerentially informative (or uninformative) for minority groups due to their higher (lower) underlying
productivity variance, e.g., Aigner and Cain [1977], Lundberg and Startz [1984], and Masters [2006]. We believe that
the evidence supports our assumption. Analysis in Hartigan and Wigdor [1989], Wigdor and Green [1991] and Jencks
and Philips [1989, chapter 2] all suggest that while tests commonly used for employee selection show marked mean
diﬀerences by race, the by-race variances are comparable and, moreover, these tests are about equally predictive of job
performance for minorities and non-minorities. As shown in Figure II and Table II, mean test scores in our sample also
diﬀer signiﬁcantly among White, Black and Hispanic applicant groups but the variances of test scores are nearly identical
for all three groups.
15As above, the majority of line workers at the establishments we study are paid the minimum wage.
10Suppose that there is no bias in testing. Then the distribution of test signals will be centered on
the true productivity of each applicant. Precisely,
(3) s ∼ N(y,1/hS),
where hS is the inverse of the variance of the interview signal (a measure of accuracy of the interview).
Assume hS does not depend on x. This generates a posterior for the ﬁrm’s perception of the applicant’s
productivity
(4) m(x,η,s) ≡ y|x,η,s ∼ N(μ(x,η,s),1/hT),
where the degree of accuracy for the posterior (based on both testing and interviews) is hT ≡ hS +hI;
and the updated mean equals μ(x,η,s) ≡ [shS + μ(x,η)hI]/hT.N o t et h a thT >h I.
B First outcome of interest: Hiring rates
To assess when testing poses an equality-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ, we study two outcomes. The ﬁrst is the
hiring gap,d e ﬁned as the hiring rate of majority workers minus the hiring rate of minority workers.
Denote the hiring decision as Hire =0 ,1 for the ﬁrm. If there is no testing, the hiring decision
will completely depend upon the ﬁrm’s prior and the results of interviews: Hire = I{μ(x,η) >κ I},
where κI is the screening threshold that yields a total hiring rate of K using interviews and I {·} is
the indicator function. The expected hiring rate of group x applicants who have received the interview
is
Eη[Hire|x]=1− Φ(zI(x)),
where zI(x) ≡ [κI − μ0 (x)]/σ0ρI and ρI ≡ Corr[μ(x,η),y]=( 1− h0/hI)
1/2.N o t et h a tw ei t e r a t e
expectations over η to obtain the unconditional hiring rate (i.e., not conditional on a speciﬁc value of
η) for group x applicants based on interviews. Speciﬁcally, Eη[Hire|x]=
R
E [Hire|x,η]f (η|x)dη.16
If both testing and interviews are used, the hiring decision is Hire = I{μ(x,η,s) >κ T}, where
κT is the screening threshold that yields a total hiring rate of K using both interviews and test scores.
The expected hiring rate of group x applicants who have received the interview and the test is:17
Eη,s[Hire|x]=1− Φ(zT(x))
where zT(x) ≡ [κT − μ0 (x)]/σ0ρT and ρT ≡ Corr[μ(x,η,s),y]=( 1− h0/hT)
1/2.
16Since η is normally distributed and assessed productivity conditional on η is normally distributed, the unconditional
distribution of perceived productivity is also normally distributed. It can be shown that the variance of the unconditional





17We iterate expectations over η and s to obtain the unconditional hiring rate for group x applicants based on interviews





11When hiring is based on interviews, the hiring gap between majority and minority workers is
γI = Eη[Hire|x1] − Eη[Hire|x2].
When hiring is based on testing and interviews, this gap is
γT = Eη,s[Hire|x1] − Eη,s[Hire|x2].
We denote the eﬀect of testing on the hiring gap as ∆γ ≡ γT − γI.
C Second outcome of interest: Productivity
A second outcome of interest is the eﬀect of testing on productivity. If only interviews are used, the
mean productivity for hired workers of group x is
(5) Eη[y|Hire=1 ,x]=μ0 (x)+σ0ρIλ(zI(x)),
where λ(zI) is the inverse Mills ratio φ(zI)/[1 − Φ(zI)], equal to the density over the distribution
function of the standard normal distribution evaluated at zI.
If both tests and interviews are used, the mean productivity for hired workers of group x is
(6) Eη,s[y|Hire=1 ,x]=μ0 (x)+σ0ρTλ(zT(x)).
A comparison of equations (5) and (6) shows that testing aﬀects the productivity of hired applicants
through two channels: selectivity (equal to one minus the hiring rate) and screening precision. All
else equal, a rise in selectivity (i.e., a reduction in hiring) for group x raises the expected productivity
of workers hired from group x by truncating the lower-tail of the group x productivity distribution.
Screening precision refers to the accuracy of the ﬁrm’s posterior, and its eﬀect is seen in the terms ρI
and ρT in equations (5) and (6),w i t hρT >ρ I (more precisely, both ρI and ρT are increasing functions
of screening precision, so hT >h I implies that ρT >ρ I). All else equal, a rise in screening precision
improves the accuracy of ﬁrms’ assessments of worker productivity and so raises the quality of hires
from each demographic group.
In addition to the impact of testing on overall productivity levels, we also study its eﬀect on the
productivity gap,d e ﬁned as the mean productivity of majority workers minus the mean productivity
of minority workers. This gap proves relevant to our empirical work because our model suggests that
testing typically moves the hiring and productivity gaps in opposite directions.
When hiring is based on interviews, the majority/minority productivity gap is
πI = Eη [y|Hire=1 ,x 1] − Eη[y|Hire =1 ,x 2].
12When hiring is based on interviews and tests, this gap is
πT = Eη,s[y|Hire=1 ,x 1] − Eη,s[y|Hire=1 ,x 2].
We denote the eﬀect of testing on the productivity gap as ∆π ≡ πT − πI.
DT h e e ﬀects of testing when both interviews and tests are unbiased
The potential for an equality-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ is relevant when one applicant group is less productive
than the other. For concreteness, and without loss of generality, suppose that minorities are the less
productive applicant group (μ0 (x2) <μ 0 (x1)). These underlying population productivity diﬀerences
imply observed diﬀerences in the hiring and productivity of minority and majority workers prior to
use of tests. First, the hiring rate of minority applicants based on interviews will be lower than that
of majority applicants (γI > 0). Second, minority workers hired using interviews will be on average
less productive than majority workers (πI > 0). Both inequalities follow from the ﬁrm’s threshold
hiring policy wherein applicants whose assessed productivity (equation (2)) exceeds a reservation
value κI are hired.18 This observation is signiﬁcant for our empirical work because, as shown in Table
I, minority workers hired using interviews are less productive, as measured by job tenure, than are
majority workers hired using interviews.
To derive the eﬀect of testing on the hiring gap, we note that the overall hiring rate in the model is
constant at K. Hence, testing must either leave hiring of both groups unaﬀected or change the hiring
rate of each group by equal but opposite amounts. It is straightforward to show by diﬀerentiation
that: (1) it is not possible for hiring of both groups to be unaﬀected; and (2) testing raises minority
hiring or, more generally, raises hiring of the applicant group with lower average productivity (see
proof in Appendix):
∆γ<0.
Intuitively, because the interview signal is error-ridden (1/hη > 0) and expected majority applicant
productivity exceeds expected minority applicant productivity, ﬁrms disproportionately hire applicants
from the group favored by their prior–that is, majority applicants. Testing increases minority hiring
because the posterior including the test score places more weight on observed signals and less weight
on group means. However, simulations show that the eﬀect of testing on the majority/minority hiring
gap is typically small under the assumed normality of the productivity distributions. We therefore do
not generally expect testing to induce a substantial change in minority hiring.
18The hiring rule (Hire = I{μ(x,η) >κ I}) equates the expected productivity of marginal hires from each applicant
group. Because the average majority applicant is more productive than the average minority applicant, the average
majority hire is also more productive than the average minority hire. As a referee pointed out, this result stems from
the fact that the normal distribution is thin-tailed.
13We obtain a similar, but stronger, result for the eﬀect of testing on the majority/minority produc-
tivity gap: although minority workers hired using interviews are less productive than majority workers
hired using interviews, testing leaves this majority/minority productivity gap essentially unaﬀected.
More precisely, testing raises productivity of both minority and majority hires approximately equally,
with exact equality as selectivity approaches one (see proof in Appendix). We write:
∆π ≈ 0.
The intuition for this result stems from two sources: ﬁrst, the threshold hiring rule equates the
productivity of marginal minority and majority hires both before and after the introduction of testing;
second, when selection is from the right-hand tail of the normal distribution, the truncated mean
increases near-linearly with the point of truncation with a ﬁrst derivative that is asymptotically equal
to unity.19 Consequently, a rise in screening precision raises the marginal and average productivity of
hires almost identically for minority and majority workers.
Summarizing, if both interviews and job tests are unbiased, testing does not pose an equality-
eﬃciency trade-oﬀ. Although job tests unambiguously raise productivity, the gains come exclusively
from improved selection within each applicant group, not from hiring shifts against minorities.
These results are illustrated in Figure IIIa, which provides a numerical simulation of the impact
of testing on hiring and productivity for a benchmark case where majority applicants are on average
more productive than minority applicants and job interviews and job tests are both unbiased. The x-
axis of the ﬁgure corresponds to the correlation between test scores and applicant ability (Corrhs,yi =
1/(1 + h0/hs)
1/2), which is rising in test precision. The y-axis depicts the hiring rate of majority and
minority applicants (left-hand scale) and the expected productivity (equivalently, ability) of majority
and minority hires gap (right-hand scale).20 Prior to the introduction of testing–equivalently, ρ =0
in the ﬁgure–minority applicants are substantially less likely than majority applicants to be hired
and are also less productive than majority workers conditional on hire. Job testing slightly reduces the
minority/majority hiring gap. But this eﬀect is small relative to the initial gap in hiring rates, even
at maximal test precision. By contrast, testing leads to a substantial rise in the productivity of both
19Numerical simulations of the normal selection model show that this asymptotic equality is numerically indistinguish-
able from exact equality at selectivity levels at or above +0.1 standard deviation from the mean (i.e. zI,z T ≥ 0.1). This
result is also visible in the numerical simulation in Figure IIIa, where the productivity gap between minority and majority
hires is invariant to testing. Recall from Table II that the overall hiring rate at this ﬁrm is 8.95 percent, implying that
zI,z T ≈ 1.34.
20In the simulation, the ability (equivalently productivity) of nonminority applicants is distributed N (0,0.29),t h e
productivity of minority applicants is distributed N (−0.19,0.27), the precision of the informal ability signal is 1/0.45,
and 8.95 percent of applicants are hired. Thus, h0 =1 /0.27, hη =1 /0.45 μ0 (x1)=0 ,μ 0 (x2)=−0.19 and K =0 .0895.
T h e s ev a l u e sa r ec h o s e nt om a t c he s t i m a t e sf r o mt h ep a r a metric model simulation in Section VI of the paper. The
precision of the job test ranges from 1/10,000 to 1/0.0001, corresponding to a correlation of (0.0,1) between test scores
and applicant ability (plotted on the x-axis).
14minority and majority hires, with the degree of improvement increasing in test precision. Consistent
with the analytic results, testing has no detectable eﬀect on the majority/minority productivity gap
at any level of test precision.
ET h e e ﬀects of testing when interviews and tests are biased: The case of identical
biases
Our main result so far is that use of an unbiased test introduced in an unbiased hiring environment
raises productivity without posing an equality-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ. We now consider how test and
interview biases aﬀect this conclusion.
Suppose there is a mean bias in interviews. So, change equation (1) to
η∗ ∼ N (y + νη(x),1/h)
where νη(x1) 6= νη(x2). We say that job interviews are minority favoring if νη(x2) >ν η(x1), and
majority favoring if νη(x1) >ν η(x2)). For example, managers may perceive majority applicants as
more productive than equally capable minority applicants, or vice versa.21
Similarly, suppose there is a mean bias in job tests. So, change equation (3) to
s∗ ∼ N (y + νs(x),1/hS)
where νs(x1) 6= νs(x2), with the deﬁnition of minority favoring and majority favoring tests analogous
to that for interviews. This might arise if tests are ‘culturally biased’ so that for given applicant
ability, minority applicants score systematically below majority applicants.
Deﬁne the net bias of interviews as ∆νη = νη (x1) − νη (x2) and, similarly, the net bias of tests as
∆νs = νs (x1) − νs (x2).I f∆νη > 0, interviews favor majority applicants, and vice versa if ∆νη < 0
(and similarly for job tests). We refer to the diﬀerence in bias between tests and interviews (∆νs−∆νη)
as the ‘relative bias’ of tests.
Assume that ﬁrms’ updated assessments of applicant productivity (based on interviews) and pos-
teriors (based on interviews and tests) are still given by equations (2) and (4) e x c e p tt h a tw en o w
substitute η∗ and s∗ for η and s. For consistency, suppose that ﬁrms’ prior for each draw from the
applicant distribution is mean-consistent with the information given by interviews, as in the unbiased
case: y|x ∼ N (μ0 (x)+νη (x),1/h0).T h u s ,ﬁrms do not compensate for biases in interviews or tests
and we say that their perceived productivity of the applicant distribution is equal to true productivity
plus interview bias.
21Equivalently, ∆νη could be interpreted as taste-discrimination: ﬁrms’ reservation productivity for minority and
majority hires diﬀers by ∆νη.
15How do these biases aﬀect our prior results for the impact of testing on equality and eﬃciency?
Suppose initially that interviews and tests are equally biased–that is, both tests and interviews contain
biases but these biases are identical (∆νs = ∆νη 6=0 ) . In this no relative bias case, our prior results
require only slight modiﬁcation:
1. Use of tests that are unbiased relative to j o bi n t e r v i e w sd o e sn o tp o s ea ne q u a l i t y - e ﬃciency
trade-oﬀ. In particular: (1) testing raises hiring of the applicant group with lower perceived
productivity, ∆μ+∆νη (the minority group by assumption); and (2) testing raises productivity
of both minority and majority hires approximately equally, with exact equality as selectivity
approaches one. Thus, expanding on our earlier conclusion: unbiasedness of both interviews and
tests (∆νs = ∆νη =0 )i sas u ﬃcient but not a necessary condition for the no-trade-oﬀ result
to hold. If both interviews and tests are equally biased (∆νs = ∆νη)–thus, there is no relative
bias–testing does not pose an equality-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ.
2. We showed above that if both interviews and tests are unbiased, the applicant group with lower
average productivity will have a lower hiring rate and lower productivity conditional on hire
than the group with higher average productivity (SignhγIi = SignhπIi). Interview and testing
biases can reverse this positive correlation. Because biases reduce selectivity of the favored
group and raise selectivity of the non-favored group, it is possible for the group with a greater
hiring rate to have lower productivity conditional on hire.22 So, if minority hires are observed
to be less productive than majority hires, this implies that either minority applicants have lower
mean productivity than majority applicants (i.e., μ0 (x2) <μ 0 (x1))o rt h a tj o bi n t e r v i e w sa r e
minority-favoring (∆νη < 0)o rb o t h .
FT h e e ﬀects of testing when interviews and tests have non-identical biases
We ﬁnally consider how job testing aﬀects the productivity and hiring gaps when the test is biased
relative to job interviews (i.e., ∆νs 6= ∆νη). For concreteness, we continue to assume that minority
applicants are perceived as less productive than majority applicants: μ0 (x1)+νη (x1) >μ 0 (x2)+
νη (x2). It is straightforward to establish the following three results:
1. Use of a job test that is biased relative to interviews: (1) raises the hiring rate of minorities if the
test favors minorities (i.e., relative to interviews) but has ambiguous eﬀects on minority hiring
otherwise; and (2) reduces the productivity level of the group favored by the test relative to the
group that is unfavored. For example, if minority applicants are perceived as less productive
22This result requires only that the absolute level of bias is suﬃcient to oﬀset underlying mean majority/minority
productivity diﬀerences, which can occur even if there is no relative bias in tests.
16than majority applicants, use of a relatively minority-favoring test will raise minority hiring and
reduce the productivity of minority relative to majority hires (thus, ∆γ<0,∆π>0).
2. If the job test is bias-reducing–that is, if the test is less biased than are job interviews (formally,
∆νη > ∆νs ≥ 0 or 0 ≥ ∆νs > ∆νη)–it unambiguously raises productivity.23 Intuitively, a
bias-reducing test improves hiring through two channels: (1) raising screening precision and (2)
reducing excess hiring of the group favored by interviews (thus, increasing selectivity for this
group). Both eﬀects are productivity-enhancing.
3. By contrast, a bias-increasing test (|∆νs| > |∆νη|) has ambiguous eﬀects on productivity.
Although testing always raises screening precision–which is productivity-enhancing–a bias-
increasing test causes excess hiring of the group that is favored by the bias, which is productivity-
reducing. The net eﬀect depends on the gains from increased screening precision relative to the
losses from increased bias.
Figure IIIb illustrates result (2). Here, we simulate the impact of testing on hiring and productivity
for a case where minority applicants are less productive than majority applicants and job interviews
are minority-favoring.24 Prior to testing (equivalently, ρ =0in the ﬁgure), the majority/minority
hiring gap is small and the majority/minority productivity gap is large relative to a setting with no
biases (Figure IIIa). This contrast with Figure IIIa reﬂects the fact that a minority-favoring interview
raises minority hiring and reduces minority productivity. Job testing counteracts this bias, leading to
a marked decline in the hiring of minority applicants and an equally marked decline in the productivity
gap between majority and minority hires (with the magnitude depending upon test precision).25 Thus,
an unbiased job test increases eﬃciency at the expense of equality if job interviews are biased in favor
of minorities.
Summarizing our three main conclusions: if job tests are relatively unbiased, they do not pose
an equality-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ; if job tests are bias-reducing, they pose an equality-eﬃciency trade-
oﬀ if and only if interviews are minority-favoring; if job tests are bias-enhancing, they may pose an
equality-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ–or they may simply reduce equality and eﬃciency simultaneously.
23However, if the test and interview have biases of opposite sign (Signh∆νsi = Signh∆νηi), testing does not necessarily
increase productivity even if job tests are less biased than interviews.
24We use the same parameter values as in Figure IIIa except that we now assume that ∆νη = μ0 (x2)−μ0 (x1)=−0.19.
25In the limiting case where job tests are fully informative, the unbiased and biased-interview cases converge to the
same hiring rates and productivity levels.
17G Empirical implications
Our illustrative model contains many speciﬁc–albeit, we believe reasonable–assumptions and so it
is unwise to generalize too broadly based on this analysis. In fact, a key purpose of the conceptual
framework is to demonstrate that, contrary to an inﬂuential line of reasoning, job testing does not
pose an intrinsic equality-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ, even if minority applicants perform worse than majority
applicants on job tests.
Beyond this observation, three general conclusions are warranted. First, the potential eﬀects of job
testing on minority hiring depend primarily on the biases of job tests relative to job interviews (and
other existing screening methods). Job tests that are unbiased relative to job interviews are unlikely
to reduce minority hiring because such tests do not adversely aﬀect ﬁrms’ average assessments of
minority productivity.
Second, testing is likely to reduce minority hiring when tests are relatively biased against minorities
(i.e., relative to interviews). In such cases, testing conveys ‘bad news’ about the productivity of mi-
nority relative to majority applicants and so is likely to adversely aﬀect minority hiring. Nevertheless,
if testing mitigates existing biases, it will still be eﬃciency-enhancing, and so an equality-eﬃciency
trade-oﬀ will be present. If instead testing augments bias, it may be eﬃciency-reducing.
Finally, testing will generally have opposite eﬀects on the hiring and productivity gaps between
majority and minority workers; a test that reduces minority hiring will typically diﬀerentially raise
minority productivity. This implication proves particularly useful for our empirical analysis.
Below, we use this model to interpret the empirical ﬁndings in light of their implications for the
relative biases of the job test and the informal screen that preceded it. To make this interpretation
rigorous, we parametrically simulate the model in section VI using observed applicant, hiring and
productivity data to calculate a benchmark for the potential impacts of job testing on the major-
ity/minority hiring and productivity gaps under alternative bias scenarios.
IV Estimating the productivity consequences of job testing
Our model is predicated on the assumption that job testing improves productivity. We verify this
assumption here. The productivity measure we study is the length of completed job spells of workers
hired with and without use of job testing. While job duration is clearly an incomplete measure of
productivity, it is likely to provide a good proxy for worker reliability since unreliable workers are
likely to quit unexpectedly or to be ﬁred for poor performance. Notably, the ﬁrm whose data we
analyze implemented job testing precisely because managers believed that turnover was too high. In
the working paper version of this article [Autor and Scarborough, 2004], we also consider a second
18productivity measure, involuntary terminations, and ﬁnd results consistent with those below.
W eb e g i nw i t ht h ef o l l o w i n gd i ﬀerence-in-diﬀerence model for job spell duration:
(7) Dijt = α + δTi + Xiβ + θt + ϕj + eijt,
where the dependent variable is the job spell duration (in days) of worker i hired at site j in year
and month t.T h e X vector includes worker race and gender, and T is an indicator variable equal
to one if the worker was screened using the job test, and zero otherwise. The θ vector contains
a complete set of month × year-of-hire eﬀects to control for seasonal and macroeconomic factors
aﬀecting job spell durations. Our main speciﬁcations also include a complete set of store eﬀects,
ϕ, which absorb time invariant factors aﬀecting job duration at each store. Since outcomes may be
correlated among workers at a given site, we use Huber-White robust standard errors clustered on
store and application method.26 For these and all subsequent models, we have also experimented
with clustering the standard errors on stores’ month-by-year of adoption to account for potential error
correlations among adoption cohorts. These standard errors prove comparable to our main estimates.
Consistent with the bivariate comparisons in Table I, the estimate of equation (7) in column 1 of
Table IV conﬁrms that Black and Hispanic workers have substantially lower mean tenure than White
employees. When 1,363 site ﬁxed eﬀects are added to the model, these race diﬀerences are reduced
by approximately 40 percent, indicating that minority workers are overrepresented at establishments
where both minority and majority workers have high turnover. Nevertheless, race diﬀerences in tenure
remain highly signiﬁcant and economically large.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table IV show that job testing raises job spell durations signiﬁcantly. In models
excluding site eﬀects and race dummies, we estimate that workers hired using the employment test
worked 8.8 days longer than those hired without use of the employment test. When site ﬁxed eﬀects
are added, this point estimate rises to 18.8 days.27 Adding controls for worker race and gender does
not change the magnitude or signiﬁcance of these job-test eﬀects. When state × time interactions
are added in column 6 to account for diﬀerential employment trends by state, the main estimate
rises slightly to 22.1 days. This represents about a 12 percent gain in average tenure relative to the
pre-testing baseline. Models that include a full set of state × month-year-of-hire interactions (not
tabulated) yield nearly identical and highly signiﬁcant results.
The tenure gains accruing from job testing are also visible in Figure IV, which plots the density and
cumulative distribution of completed job spells of tested and non-tested hires. The distribution of spells
26We exclude from these models the 2 percent of spells that are incomplete.
27The ﬂow of hires in our sample intrinsically overrepresents workers hired at high-turnover stores (relative to the
stock of hires). When testing is introduced, a disproportionate share of tested hires are therefore hired at high turnover
establishments. Adding site eﬀects to the model controls for this composition bias and hence raises the point estimate
for the job testing indicator variable (compare columns 3 and 4).
19for tested hires lies noticeably to the right of the distribution for non-tested hires and generally has
greater mass at higher job durations and lower mass at shorter durations. As shown in the lower panel
of the ﬁgure, the job spell distribution of tested hires almost entirely ﬁrst order stochastically dominates
that of non-tested hires. Quantile regression estimates for job spell durations (not tabulated) conﬁrm
that the eﬀect of testing on job spell duration is statistically signiﬁcant and monotonically increasing
in magnitude from the 10th to the 75th percentiles. These models ﬁnd that testing increased median
tenure by 8 to 9 days, which is roughly a 10 percent gain (thus comparable to the estimated eﬀect at
the mean).
A Endogeneity of testing?
Our ﬁndings could be biased if the decision to test a worker is endogenous. We observe that in the one
to two months following the rollout of testing at a site, 10 to 25 percent of new hires are not tested.
This may be due to operational issues following system installation (i.e., the kiosk is oﬄine) or due to
record-keeping lags wherein workers oﬀered a job shortly before the advent of testing do not appear on
the payroll until after testing is already in use. A more pernicious concern, however, is that managers
could circumvent testing to hire preferred candidates–a potential source of endogeneity bias.
To purge any potential endogeneity, we estimate a two-stage least squares (2SLS) version of equa-
tion (7) in which we use a dummy variable indicating that a store has adopted testing as an instru-
mental variable for the tested status of all applicants at the store. Since we do not know the exact
installation date of the testing kiosk at a store, we use the date of the ﬁrst observed tested hire to
proxy for the rollout date. The coeﬃcient on the store-adoption dummy in the ﬁrst stage equation of
0.89 indicates that once a store has adopted testing, the vast majority of subsequent hires are tested.28
The 2SLS estimates of the eﬀect of testing on job spell durations shown in columns 7 through 10 of
Table IV are quite similar to the corresponding OLS models, suggesting that endogeneity of individual
test status is not a substantial source of bias.
A second source of endogeneity is that the timing of stores’ adoption of testing might be correlated
with potential outcomes. Although all stores in our data adopt testing during the sample window,
the timing of adoption is not necessarily entirely random. To our understanding, the rollout order
of stores was determined by geography, technical infrastructure, and internal personnel decisions. If,
however, stores adopted testing when they experienced a rise in turnover, mean reversion in the length
of employment spells could cause us to overestimate the causal eﬀect of testing on workers’ job spell
durations.29
28At a b l eo fﬁrst-stage estimates for the 2SLS models is available from the authors.
29Managers who we interviewed were not aware of any consideration of store-level personnel needs in the choice of
rollout order. They also pointed out that timely analysis of store-level personnel data was not feasible prior to the Unicru
20As a check on this possibility, we augmented equation (7) for job spell duration with leads and lags
of test adoption. These models (available from the authors) capture the trend in job spell durations for
workers hired at each store in the nine months surrounding introduction of testing: four months prior
to three months post adoption. While the lead estimates in these models are in no case signiﬁcant
and have inconsistent signs, the lag (post-rollout) dummies show that workers hired in the ﬁrst month
of testing have 12 days above average job spell duration, and workers hired in subsequent months
have 17 to 25 days above average duration (in all cases signiﬁcant). Thus, our main estimates do not
appear confounded by pre-existing trends in job spell duration.30
B Do test scores predict productivity?
It would be valuable to corroborate these ﬁndings by showing that test scores predict worker pro-
ductivity. We would ideally proceed by regressing gains in store level productivity on gains in test
scores for cohorts of workers hired at the same stores before and after the advent of job testing. Our
strong expectation is that stores that saw greater increases in worker ‘quality’ as measured by test
scores would have experienced larger gains in productivity. Unfortunately, the ﬁrm that we study
did not collect baseline test score data for cohorts of workers hired prior to the use of testing. As
an alternative, we draw on the database of 189,067 applications submitted to the 1,363 stores in our
sample during the year after the rollout of employment testing (Table II). Under the assumption that
the characteristics of applicants by store were stable before and after the introduction of job testing,
these data can be used to benchmark the relationship between test scores and productivity.31
We estimate the following variant of our main model for worker tenure:
(8) Dijst = α + ζ ¯ Sj + Xiβ + θt + χs + eijt.
Here, the dependent variable is the completed job spell duration of workers hired at each store j in
state s, ¯ Sj is the average test score of store j0s applicants, which serves as a proxy for the average
‘quality’ of applicants at the store, and χs is a vector of state dummies. If test scores are predictive
of worker productivity (as our analysis so far suggests) stores with lower average applicant quality
should exhibit lower overall productivity prior to the advent of testing.
Table V presents estimates. Column 1 ﬁnds a sizable, positive relationship between store-level
average applicant ‘quality’ and the productivity of workers hired prior to the use of testing. A one-
installation.
30We also estimated a version of equation (7) augmented with separate test-adoption dummies for each cohort of
adopting stores, where a cohort is deﬁned by the month and year of adoption. These estimates ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of
testing on job spell duration for 9 of 12 adopter cohorts, 6 of which are signiﬁcant at p<0.05.N o n eo ft h e3 negative
point estimates is signiﬁcant.
31We cannot link test scores of workers in the primary sample to their employment outcomes, however.
21standard deviation diﬀerence in mean applicant quality (cross store standard deviation of 0.16) predicts
a 6.3 day diﬀerence in mean store job duration. Since we cannot include site eﬀects in these cross-
sectional models, subsequent columns add controls for state-speciﬁc trends and measures of minority
resident share and median household income in the store’s zip code (calculated from the Census STF
ﬁles). These covariates have little impact on the coeﬃcient of interest.
The next three columns provide estimates of the relationship between store-level productivity and
mean test scores of hired workers. These point estimates are likely to be substantially attenuated
by measurement error since the hired sample used to calculate the means is only 10 percent as large
as the applicant sample. Despite this, we ﬁnd an equally large coeﬃcient for the test-score variable.
Because the cross-store standard deviation of hired worker test scores (0.32)i sa b o u tt w i c ea sl a r g ea s
the cross-store standard deviation of applicant test scores, the standardized eﬀect size of 13 days of
tenure is also twice as large. When we instrument the test scores of hires with those of applicants to
reduce the inﬂuence of measurement error (columns 7 through 9), the point estimate on the test score
variable increases in magnitude by about a third. Taken together, these results demonstrate that job
test scores have signiﬁcant predictive power for worker productivity.
CT e s t i n g f o r d i ﬀerential productivity impacts by race
A central implication of the model is that if job tests are unbiased relative to job interviews, they will
raise the productivity of majority and minority hires equally. Conversely, if tests are relatively biased
against minorities, they should raise the productivity of minority hires by more than majority hires
(and vice versa if tests are majority-favoring). To assess the impact of testing on the productivity of
majority and minority hires, we estimate an augmented version of equation (7) where we replace the
‘tested’ dummy variable with a full set of interactions between tested-status and the three race groups
in our sample:
(9) Dijt = α + δwTi × Whitei + δbTi × Blacki + δhTi × Hispanici + Xiβ + θt + ϕj + eijt.
The parameters of interest in this equation, δb, δh and δw, estimate the diﬀerential gains in job spell
duration for tested Black, Hispanic and White hires relative to their non-tested counterparts.
Table VI presents OLS and 2SLS estimates of equation (9). In the baseline speciﬁcation in column
1, which excludes site eﬀects and state trends, we estimate that job testing raised spell durations by
14 days among White hires, 15 days among Black hires, and −1.2 days among Hispanic hires. When
site eﬀects and state trends are added, these point estimates rise to 23 days for both Black and White
hires and 13 days for Hispanic hires. The tenure gains for Whites and Blacks are highly signiﬁcant.
Those for Hispanics are signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level in the ﬁnal speciﬁcation but not otherwise.
22A test of the joint equality of the tenure gains by race accepts the null at p =0 .36. In subsequent
columns, we present 2SLS estimates using site adoption of testing as an instrument for whether or not
an individual hire received the employment test. These models show comparable patterns.
In net, we ﬁnd that testing had similar impacts on productivity for all worker groups. In the case
of Black versus White productivity gains, the point estimates are extremely close in magnitude in all
models. Although estimated tenure gains are smaller for Hispanic hires than for other groups, the
data do not reject the hypothesis that tenure gains are identical for all three groups (Whites, Black
and Hispanics).
DR o b u s t n e s s c h e c k s
A natural concern with job spell duration as a productivity measure is that it captures quantity but not
quality of labor input. Consider, for example, that college students hired during their summer breaks
may be more capable or reliable than average workers and yet may have shorter job stints. As one
check on this possibility, we reestimated all models in Tables IV and VI while excluding all workers
hired in May, June, November and December–that is, the cohorts most likely to include seasonal
hires. These estimates, available from the authors, are closely comparable to our main results.
To supplement the evidence from the job duration analysis, it would be valuable to have a more
direct measure of worker productivity. In Autor and Scarborough [2004], we explore one such mea-
sure: ﬁring for cause. Using linked personnel records, we distinguished for-cause terminations (e.g.,
theft, job abandonment, insubordination) from neutral or positive terminations (e.g., return to school,
relocation, new employment). Consistent with the results for job tenure above, these models ﬁnd that
job testing modestly reduced ﬁring-for-cause and signiﬁcantly reduced voluntary turnover without
yielding diﬀerential impacts on minority and majority hires.
V Testing for disparate impacts of testing on minority hiring
Did the productivity gains from testing come at a cost of reduced minority hiring? Although the test
score distributions of Black, White and Hispanic job applicants diﬀer signiﬁcantly (Figure II), the
test score distributions of Black, White and Hispanic hires are quite comparable (Figure V)). The
reason is that the hired population from each race group almost entirely excludes the lower tail of the
applicant distribution, where a disproportionate share of Black and Hispanic applicants reside. The
contrast between Figures II and V suggests that disparate hiring impacts were a real possibility.
Yet, initial evidence suggests that a disparate impact did not occur. Unconditional comparisons
of hiring by demographic group in Table I show a slight increase in minority employment after the
implementation of job testing. To provide a rigorous test, we contrast changes in minority versus
23majority hiring at stores adopting testing relative to stores not adopting during the same time interval.
The outcome variable of interest is the minority hiring rate,e q u a lt ot h eﬂow of minority hires over
minority applicants. Unfortunately, our data measure the ﬂow of hires but not the ﬂow of applicants.
To see the complication this creates, let Pr(x2|Hire=1 )equal the probability that a new hire is
a minority worker and let Pr(x1|Hire=1 )be the corresponding probability for a majority worker.

















The odds that a newly hired worker is a minority is a function of both the minority/majority hiring
rate and the minority/majority application rate (Pr{x2}/Pr{x1}). Since we lack data on application
rates, we must assume that minority/majority application rates are roughly constant within stores
over time to isolate the pure impact of testing on the minority/majority hiring rate.32
To perform this estimate, we ﬁt the following conditional (‘ﬁxed-eﬀects’) logit model,
(10) Pr(x2|Hire=1 )=F
¡
ξTi + Xiβ + θt + ϕj
¢
,
where x2 indicates that a hired worker is a minority, the vectors ϕ and θ contain a complete set of store
and month-by-year of hire dummies, and F (·) is the cumulative logistic function.33 The coeﬃcient,
ξ,m e a s u r e st h et o t a le ﬀect of job testing on the log odds that a newly hired worker is a minority. If
our assumption is correct that minority/majority application rates are roughly constant within stores,
these rates will be ‘conditioned out’ by the store ﬁxed eﬀects and ˆ ξ will capture the impact of job
testing on the minority hiring rate. If this assumption fails, ˆ ξ still provides a valid estimate of the
causal eﬀect of job testing on minority hiring but in that case, we cannot separate the eﬀect of testing
on application versus hiring rates.
The top panel of Table VII reports estimates for the change in the log hiring odds of Black, White
and Hispanic applicants. These models yield li t t l ee v i d e n c et h a te m p l o y m e n tt e s t i n ga ﬀected relative
hiring odds by race. In all speciﬁcations, the logit coeﬃcient on the job testing dummy variable is
small relative to its standard error (z<1).
As a supplemental test, we ﬁt in panel B of Table VII a simple ﬁxed-eﬀects, linear probability
m o d e lo ft h ef o r m :
32Unicru personnel believe that the application kiosks attract more job seekers overall but have no information on how
kiosks aﬀect application rates by race. One might speculate that the kiosks discourage minority applicants since minorities
are disproportionately likely to have criminal records [Petit and Western, 2004] and completing the electronic application
requires providing a social security number and authorizing a criminal background check. Such discouragement would
bias our results towards the ﬁnding that job testing reduced the minority hiring rate.
33We use a conditional logit model to avoid the incidental parameters problem posed when estimating a conventional
maximum likelihood model with a very large number of ﬁxed eﬀects (1,363).
24(11) E (x2|Hire=1 )=α + ψTi + Xiβ + θt + ϕj.
This model measures the eﬀect of testing on the share of hires who are minorities. So that coeﬃcients
may be read as percentage points, point estimates and standard errors are multiplied by 100.I na l l
cases, the estimated impact of testing on hiring rates by race is under one half of one percentage point
and insigniﬁcant. The 2SLS estimates of these models (panel C) are similar to the corresponding OLS
models, implying an even smaller reduction in Black hiring and a slightly larger reduction in Hispanic
hiring. These point estimates suggest that testing had negligible eﬀects on the race distribution of
workers.34
A Disparate hiring impacts: A second test
Since the hiring results are central to our conclusions, we test their robustness by analyzing a com-
plementary source of variation. Prior to the advent of testing, we observe a tight link between the
neighborhoods in which stores operate and the race of workers that they hire: stores in minority and
low-income zip codes hire a disproportionate share of minority workers. We use this link to explore
whether testing changed the relationship between stores’ neighborhood demographics and the race of
hires. Speciﬁcally, we estimate a variant of equation (11) a u g m e n t e dw i t hm e a s u r e so ft h em i n o r i t y
share or median income of residents in the store’s zip code, calculated from the 2000 U.S. Census
STF-1 ﬁles.
Column 1 of Table VIII shows that, prior to the use of job testing, a store situated in a zip code
with a 10 percentage point higher share of non-White residents would be expected to have an 8.7
percentage point higher share of non-White employees. The point estimate in column 2 shows that
this relationship was essentially unchanged by testing. The next two columns make this point formally.
When we pool tested and non-tested hires and add an interaction between the test dummy and the
share of non-White residents in the zip code, this interaction term is close to zero and insigniﬁcant.
When site dummies are included (column 4)–thus absorbing the main eﬀect of the zip code’s non-
White resident share–the interaction term is again small and insigniﬁcant.
Panel B provides analogous estimates for the relationship between the racial composition of em-
ployees and neighborhood household income. In the pre-testing period, stores in more aﬄuent zip
34Lead-and-lag estimates for the eﬀect of testing on race composition are generally insigniﬁcant and do not have
consistent signs. The point estimates suggest a brief rise in black hiring and decline in white hiring in the ﬁrst three
months following the introduction of testing, followed by a slight reduction in Black hiring and rise in White hiring in
months three forward. These latter eﬀects are far from statistically signiﬁcant. A table of estimates is available from the
authors.
25codes had a substantially higher share of White employees: 10 additional log points of neighbor-
hood household income was associated with a 3.2 percentage point greater share of White employees.
Employment testing did not alter this link. For all demographic groups, and for both measures of
neighborhood demographics, the pre-post change in the relationship between neighborhood charac-
teristics and the group membership of hires is insigniﬁcant and is close to zero in the model with site
dummies.
VI What conclusions do the data support? A model-based test
In this ﬁnal section, we apply the theoretical model from section III to synthesize and interpret the
ﬁndings above. Drawing on the applicant, hiring and productivity databases summarized in Tables I
and II, we parametrically simulate the model to assess what combinations of interview bias, test bias,
and underlying majority/minority productivity diﬀerences are most consistent with the ﬁndings. One
overriding conclusion emerges from this exercise: the data readily accept the hypothesis that both job
tests and job interviews are unbiased and that the average productivity of White applicants exceeds
that of Black applicants. By contrast, the plausible alternatives that we consider–most signiﬁcantly,
that the job test is relatively biased against minorities–are rejected.
A Simulation procedure
Let observed job spell durations, D, be a linear function of applicant ability y,w i t hD = α + ϑy,
where ϑ>0 is a parameter to be estimated from the data. Suppose that the ability of an applicant
drawn at random from the distribution of group x applicants is equal to y = μ0 (x)+ε0.P r i o r t o
the introduction of job testing, ﬁr m sh a v ea c c e s st oa ninterview signal, η, for each applicant that
is correlated with ability. When job testing is introduced, it provides a second signal, s,t h a ti sa l s o
correlated with ability. We assume initially that both interviews and tests are unbiased, with η = y+εη
and s = y + εs. In these expressions, ε0, εs and εη are mean-zero error terms that are normally and
independently distributed, with variances to be estimated from the data.
To estimate the variance parameters, we use the following empirical moments: the mean test score
of applicants is normalized to zero and the mean test score of workers hired using the test is 0.707
(Table II); the variance of test scores is normalized at one (hence, 1=σ2
0 + σ2
s);35 the observed
hiring rate is equal to 8.95 percent; and the average gain in productivity from testing is 21.8 days
(Table IV). We make a further adjustment for the fact that the observed hiring rate is only 22
p e r c e n ta tt h e95th percentile of the score distribution (see Table II), implying either that stores are








0), not their levels, that determines the informativeness of the signals. Thus,





26extraordinarily selective or, more plausibly, that a portion of applicants is turned away because there
are no vacancies.36 Since ability is unobserved, we cannot directly estimate the structural relationship
between ability and job spell duration, ϑ. Instead, we use the empirical relationship between test
scores and productivity from Table V (ˆ ζ =5 3 .9 in equation (8)) to calculate the implied value of ϑ
based on other moments of the model. Putting these pieces together, we calculate that ˆ σ2
s =0 .71,
ˆ σ2
η =0 .45 and ˆ σ2
0 =0 .29. Hence, test scores have approximately 60 percent more measurement error
than do interviews.37
Using these parameter estimates in combination with the database of 189,067 applications sum-
marized in Table II, we implement the following simulation procedure:38
1. For each applicant, we draw a simulated ability level, y, as a function of the applicant’s observed
test score and the estimated error variance of the test. Although this simulated ability level is
not observed by employers, it contributes to applicants’ interview and test scores and completely
determines their job spell durations conditional on hire.
2. Using the ability draws and the estimated variance parameters, we draw an ‘interview signal’
for each applicant. In contrast to applicant ability levels, these interview signals are observed
by ﬁrms and are used for hiring.
3. Using applicants’ interview signals, their race, and ﬁrms’ priors, we calculate ﬁrms’ ‘interview-
based’ posterior productivity assessment for each applicant (see equation (2)).
4. We then simulate hiring under the interview-based regime by calculating a store-speciﬁc interview-
based hiring threshold such that the count of applicants whose interview-based posterior assess-
ment meets the threshold exactly equals the count of hires observed at the store. Applicants
meeting the threshold are labeled ‘interview-based hires.’
5. We next use the draws of ability, y, to calculate the job spell durations of interview-based
hires (equal to D =ˆ α + ˆ ϑy). In combination, steps (4) and (5) allow us to calculate the
race composition and productivity of hires (both overall and by race) under the interview-based
regime.
36To adjust for vacancies, we estimate the hiring rate conditional on a vacancy (‘active hiring rate’) by calculating what
the model implies that the hiring rate should be at the 95th percentile of the test score distribution given other estimated
parameters. If the observed rate is lower than the calculated rate, we attribute the diﬀerence to lack of vacancies and
impute the active hiring rate as the ratio of the implied hiring rate to the observed hiring rate. In practice, the active
hiring rate is solved simultaneously with the other parameters of the model since they are not independent. We estimate
the active hiring rate at 40.4%;t h a ti s ,4 in 10 applicants are hired when a vacancy is present.
37It would be highly surprising to ﬁnd that tests are more informative than interviews since the item response data
gathered by the personality test appear (to us) crude relative to the nuances of attitude and behavior observable during
interviews.
38We sketch the procedure here, with further detals available in an unpublished appendix.
276. To obtain analogous outcomes under the test-based regime, we repeat steps (3) through (5),
making two modiﬁcations to the procedure. First, we replace ﬁrms’ interview-based posterior
productivity assessments with their test-based posterior productivity assessments (see equa-
tion (4)).39 Second, when performing the simulated hiring process in step (4), we replace the
interview-based hiring threshold with a test-based hiring threshold that generates an identical
number of hires at each store.
7. In the ﬁnal step, we compare the race composition and productivity of hires (overall and by
race) under the interview-based and test-based regimes. Since the distribution of ability and the
hiring rate are identical at each store under each regime, a comparison of (simulated) hiring and
productivity outcomes under these two regimes provides an estimate of the pure screening eﬀect
of testing on equality and eﬃciency.
This baseline procedure simulates the case where both interviews and tests are unbiased. It must
be slightly extended to explore cases where test or interview biases are present. Table II shows that
applicants from the majority group score signiﬁcantly higher on the job test than applicants from the
minority group. We accordingly consider two cases for test bias: in the ﬁrst case, tests are unbiased
and, by implication, minority applicants are on average less productive than majority applicants; in
the second case, we assume that job tests are majority-favoring while minority and majority applicants
have the same average productivity.40
We allow for the possibility of interview bias in a parallel fashion. Because the data provide no
guidance on the possible sign of interview bias, we consider three cases: no bias, minority-favoring
bias, and majority-favoring bias. In the unbiased case, the interview signal is equal to η = y + εη,
as above. In the minority-favoring case, the interview signal additionally includes an additive bias
term that precisely oﬀsets the mean test score diﬀerences between minority and majority applicants.
Conversely, in the majority-favoring case, the interview signal contains a bias of equal magnitude and
opposite sign to the minority-favoring case.
These assumptions give rise to six permutations of the simulation: two cases of testing bias (unbi-
ased and majority-favoring) permuted with three cases of interview bias (unbiased, minority-favoring
and majority-favoring). For each scenario, we perform 1,000 trials of the simulation to obtain mean
outcomes and bootstrapped standard errors, equal to the standard deviation of outcomes across trials.
39These test-based posteriors diﬀer from the interview-based posteriors only in that they incorporate both interview
and test signals.
40Since we do not know the true mean ability of each applicant group–only the group’s mean test score–we make the
following ancillary assumptions: if job tests are unbiased, mean ability for each applicant group is equal to the groups’s
mean test score. If job tests are majority favoring, mean ability for each applicant group is equal to the White mean.
28Because our focus is on Black-White diﬀerences, we discuss and tabulate results for only these two
groups. Hispanics are included in the simulation, however.
B Simulation results
Table IX summarizes the simulation results. Columns 1 through 6 present the simulated productivity
and hiring eﬀects of testing under each of the six scenarios considered. For comparison, column 7 lists
the actual outcome statistics for each productivity and hiring measure (from Tables I, VI and VII).
The bottom row of each panel provides chi-squared statistics for the goodness of ﬁt of the simulated
outcomes to their observed counterparts.41
A ss h o w ni nc o l u m n7 ,p r i o rt ot h eu s eo fj o bt e s t i ng, the unconditional mean job spell duration
gap between White and Black hires was 45 days. Our analysis found that testing raised mean White
and Black job spell durations by 23 days each, leading to no change in the productivity gap. Testing
also yielded no signiﬁcant change in the racial composition of hires, though our point estimates suggest
ai n c r e a s ei nt h eW h i t ee m p l o y m e n ts h a r eo f0.24 percentage points. How do the simulation results
compare to the actual outcomes?
Only one of the six simulation scenarios closely corresponds to the data. This is the case where
interviews and job tests are unbiased and average White productivity exceeds average Black produc-
tivity (column 1). Under this scenario, the simulation predicts a gain of 18.6 and 19.9 days respectively
for White and Black job spells, as compared to an observed rise of 23.2 days. The simulation further
implies a 52 day gap in mean job spell duration between White and Black applicants hired using the
informal screen, as compared to the observed diﬀerence of 44.9 days. A chi-squared test of goodness
of ﬁt of these estimates (bottom row of panel A) readily accepts the null of equality between the
observed and simulated statistics (p =0 .50). Alongside these productivity impacts, the simulation
predicts a small rise in Black employment (panel B). This predicted value does not diﬀer signiﬁcantly
from the small observed decline in Black employment.42 An omnibus test of goodness of ﬁtf o rb o t h
productivity and employment outcomes (panel C) accepts the null at p =0 .33.
It is also instructive to consider the cases that do not ﬁt the observed outcomes. The alternative
scenario that comes closest to matching the data is one in which job interviews are biased towards
41To compare each simulated statistic with its observed value, we calculate the following chi-square square statistic











To calculate pooled summary tests for each simulation scenario, we sum the χ
2 statistics and the degrees of freedom (thus,
treating each statistic as independent). When performing pooled tests, we exclude redundant statistics. For example,
we include the changes in White and Black productivity but exclude the change in the Black-White productivity gap.
42We have also performed goodness of ﬁt tests for changes in log-odds of hiring rather than changes in employment
shares. Results are similar to those tabulated but statistical power is lower.
29whites, the job test is unbiased and the expected productivity of White applicants exceeds that of
Black applicants (column 2). As in the prior case, the simulation suggests comparable tenure gains
for Whites and Blacks of 20.4 and 19.7 days.43 Here, however, the predicted initial productivity
gap of 30.1 days falls far short of the observed diﬀerence of 44.9 days. Where this scenario departs
most substantially from the data, however, is in its predictions for minority hiring. Because the job
test is assumed to be relatively minority-favoring, the simulation predicts a substantial gain in Black
employment, leading to a closing of the White-Black employment gap of 4.1 percentage points. This
prediction is rejected by the data since the actual change in White-Black employment is negligible.
A second scenario of particular interest is shown in Column 3. Here, the informal screen is minority-
favoring, the job test is unbiased (thus, the job test is relatively biased against minorities) and average
White productivity exceeds average Black productivity. As per the Introduction, this is the focal case
where job testing could produce a disparate impact–reducing Black hiring while raising productivity
diﬀerentially for Blacks hires (as well as overall). Consistent with expectations, the simulation predicts
as i g n i ﬁcant diﬀerential gain in job duration of 6.3 days for Black relative to White hires and a small
decline in Black employment. In practice this scenario is rejected by the data (p =0 .00) since there
was neither a diﬀerential gain in Black productivity nor a fall in Black hiring. We therefore reject the
presence of an equality-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ in this setting.
Consider ﬁnally the cases in columns 4 through 6, where Black and White applicants are assumed
to have identical mean productivity. These scenarios are at odds with the data in one key respect:
all predict substantially smaller minority-majority gaps in initial productivity than are observed in
the data; in two of three cases, these gaps are of the wrong sign. This pattern underscores that it
is diﬃcult to square the hypothesis that minority and majority applicants have the same underlying
productivity with the fact that job spell durations of minority hires are substantially shorter than
those of majority hires. To reconcile these two observations, one must assume, as in column 6, that
job interviews are heavily minority-favoring. Under this assumption, however, job testing is predicted
to substantially raise White employment, which does not occur.
In net, the simulation results reject each of the scenarios considered except one in which both
job interviews and job tests are unbiased and White applicants are on average more productive than
Black applicants. This leads us to conclude that job testing increased the precision of worker selection
without yielding disparate impacts because both job interviews and job tests were unbiased.
43Given that the job test in this scenario is relatively biased towards minorities, one may wonder why the model does
not predict a greater rise in the productivity of White relative to Black hires. We do not have a precise answer to
this question, but believe it stems from the fact that the distribution of Black productivity is relatively ﬂat near the
hiring threshold. Thus, a marginal increase in the selectivity of Black hires does not yield a substantial change in the
productivity of black hires.
30VII Conclusion
An inﬂuential body of research concludes that the use of standardized job tests for employment
screening poses an intrinsic equality-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ: testing improves selection but reduces mi-
nority hiring. We develop a simple conceptual model that demonstrates that this equality-eﬃciency
trade-oﬀ is only unambiguously present when job tests counter pre-existing screening biases favoring
minority applicants. By contrast, if job tests are unbiased relative to the screens they supplement,
there is no equality-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ–gains in productivity do not come at a cost of lower minority
hiring. Since we see little reason to suspect that existing informal screens are minority-favoring or that
job tests are more biased against minorities than are informal screens, we believe that the presumed
equality-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ likely to be largely irrelevant in practice.
We studied the evidence for an equality-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ in employment testing at a large, geo-
graphically dispersed retail ﬁrm whose 1,363 stores switched over the course of one year from informal,
paper-based hiring to a computer-supported screening process that relies heavily on a standardized
personality test. The advent of employment testing increased productivity, raising mean and median
employee tenure by 10 to 12 percent and slightly lowering the frequency of terminations for cause.
Consistent with expectations, minority applicants performed signiﬁcantly worse on the employment
test. Had the informal screen that predated testing been comparatively minority-favoring such that
it masked underlying majority/minority diﬀerences in average productivity, our model suggests that
employment testing would have slightly diminished Black employment and raised the productivity
of Black hires by approximately 40 percent more than it raised the productivity of White hires. In
point of fact, we detect no change in the racial composition of hires and, moreover, productivity gains
were equally large among minority and majority hires. These ﬁndings, paired with evidence from a
parametric simulation of our theoretical model, lead us to conclude that both the job test and the
informal screen were unbiased. Thus, job testing did not pose an equality-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ because
the job test raised screening precision without introducing bias.44
In considering the external validity of these ﬁndings, several caveats are in order. First, our data
come from only one large retailer. Since retail ﬁrms in the U.S. operate in a competitive environment,
we might anticipate that other ﬁrms would respond similarly. Nevertheless, analysis of other cases
is clearly warranted. A second caveat is that the between-group diﬀerences in test scores found
44A ﬁnal alternative interpretation of the ﬁndings is that minority and majority workers are equally productive but
that the productivity measures are themselves contaminated by race bias. In this case, our ﬁndings would indicate only
that the job test was unbiased relative to the informal screen but not necessarily unbiased in a cardinal sense. While
we cannot dismiss this alternative hypothesis using available data, previous studies that benchmark standardized tests
scores against objective productivity measures in civilian and military settings ﬁnd no evidence to suggest that such tests
are race-biased [Hartigan and Wigdor, 1989; Wigdor and Green, 1991; and Jencks and Philips, 1998, chapter 2].
31by the employment test used at this ﬁrm are not as large as diﬀerences found on other standard
ability tests such as the Armed Forces Qualiﬁcation Test. This fact limits the power of our analysis
to distinguish competing scenarios, and one might posit that an alternative employment test that
revealed larger group productivity diﬀerences might potentially generate disparate impacts. Although
we do not discount this possibility, we generally expect that employers will account for expected
group productivity diﬀerences. Hence, a test that reveals large disparities on some measure should not
necessarily pose an equality-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ. Moreover, employment testing guidelines issued by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission make it legally precarious for ﬁrms to use employment
tests that ‘pass’ minority applicants at less than 80 percent of the pass-rate of majority applicants.
Hence, employment tests will not generally show greater group diﬀerences than those found here.
An important ﬁnal point of interpretation is that our results speak only to ﬁrms’ private gains
from improved worker selection. The extent to which these private gains translate into social beneﬁts
depends on the mechanism by which testing improves selection. If testing improves the quality of
matches between workers and ﬁrms, the attendant gains in allocative eﬃciency are likely to raise social
welfare [Costrell and Loury 2004]. By contrast, if testing primarily redistributes ‘desirable’ workers
among competing ﬁrms where they would have comparable marginal products, social beneﬁts will be
decidedly smaller than private beneﬁts [cf. Stiglitz, 1975; Lazear, 1986; Masters, 2006]. Moreover,
since testing itself is costly, the net social beneﬁts in the pure screening case could potentially be
negative. Though our results provide little guidance as to which of these scenarios is most relevant, it
appears unlikely that the social beneﬁts from testing exceed the private beneﬁts. Quantifying these
social beneﬁts is an important area for research.
VIII Appendix: Proofs of selected propositions
A Preliminaries
Suppose there is no formal testing. Decompose η∗ as η∗ = η + νη(x); an applicant from group x is
hired iﬀ μ(x,η∗) >κ I,w h e r eμ(x,η∗)=
hη
hI η∗+ h0





>κ I − νη(x)
η>
hI(κI − νη(x)) − h0μ0(x)
hη
.
Since we can decompose η as η = y +εη,w i t hεη ∼ N (0,1/hη) and independent of y, the distribution

























[κI − νη(x) − μ0(x)]
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where ρI ≡ Corr[μ(x,η),y]=( 1− h0/hI)
1/2 and the probability that an applicant from group x is
hired is 1 − Φ(z∗
I(x)).



























Consider now the case with formal testing. Decomposing s∗ as s∗ = s+νs(x), an applicant is hired
iﬀ μ(x,η∗,s ∗) >κ T,w h e r eμ(x,η∗,s ∗)= hs
hT s∗ + hI
hT μ(x,η∗)=μ(x,η,s)+ hs
hT νs(x)+ hI
hT νη(x).T h u s
the applicant is hired iﬀ
μ(x,η,s)=
hss + hηη + h0μ0(x)
hT
=









33w h e r ew ew r i t es = y +εs and η = y +εη.S i n c ey, εs, and εη are independent and hs +hη +h0 = hT,












































κT − μ0(x) − hs





and the probability of a hire is 1 − Φ(z∗
T(x)).












where ρT ≡ Corr[μ(x,η,s),y]=( 1− h0/hT)
1/2.
We will also need to make use of the following lemma:
Lemma Let λ(z)=
φ(z)
1−Φ(z).T h e nlim




λ(t) − t =l i m
t→∞
1 √





λ(t) − t =l i m
t→∞
− 1 √





















Testing reduces the majority/minority hiring gap (unbiased case with minority applicants
less productive than majority applicants).
Assume without loss of generality that x1 is the more productive group, and let γ1 = Eη,s[Hire|x1]−
Eη[Hire|x1] and γ2 = Eη,s[Hire|x2] − Eη[Hire|x2]. A constant hiring rate implies that testing either
leaves hiring of both groups unaﬀected or moves the hiring rate of each group by equal but opposite
amounts (either γ1,γ2 =0or γ1 = −γ2 6=0 ). We note that ∆γ can be expressed as ∆γ = γ1 − γ2.
The introduction of testing without a change in bias is identically equal to a rise in screening
precision. We can therefore sign ∆γ by diﬀerentiating γ1 and γ2 with respect to ρT, bearing in mind














where zT(x) ≡ [κT − μ0 (x)]/σ0ρT.S i n c e φ(·) > 0 and zT (x1) <z T (x2), it cannot be the case
that γ1 and γ2 are simultaneously equal to zero. Therefore SignhzT (x1) − [∂κT/∂ρT]/σ0i = − Sign
hzT (x2) − [∂κT/∂ρT]/σ0i. Given that zT (x1) <z T (x2), we conclude that γ1 < 0,γ 2 > 0 and
∆γ = γ1 − γ2 < 0. Testing therefore raises minority hiring or, more generally, raises hiring of the
group with lower average productivity.
35C Claim III.D.2
The eﬀect of testing on the productivity gap approaches zero as the proportion of applicants
hired approaches zero (unbiased case).
We can write
∆π = σ0ρT[λ(zT(x1)) − λ(zT(x2))] − σ0ρI[λ(zI(x1)) − λ(zI(x2))].
Deﬁne








Now consider taking limits as K → 0;a sK → 0, zT(x2) →∞and zI(x2) →∞while αT and αI
remain ﬁxed constants. Recall that lim
z→∞λ(z) − z =0 ,s ot h a t
lim
zj(x2)→∞
[λ(zj(x2)+αj) − (zj(x2)+αj)] − [λ(zj(x2)) − zj(x2)] = 0
lim
zj(x2)→∞
[λ(zj(x2)+αj) − λ(zj(x2))] = αj,
for j ∈ {T,I}. It follows that
lim
K→0
∆π = σ0ρTαT − σ0ρIαI
= ∆μ0 − ∆μ0
=0 .
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39Frequency  % of Total Frequency  % of Total Frequency % of Total
All 33,924 100% 25,561 75% 8,363 25%
White 23,560 69.5 18,057 70.6 5,503 65.8
Black 6,262 18.5 4,591 18.0 1,671 20.0
Hispanic 4,102 12.1 2,913 11.4 1,189 14.2
Male 17,444 51.4 13,008 50.9 4,436 53.0
Female 16,480 48.6 12,553 49.1 3,927 47.0
Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean
All 99 173.7 96 173.3 107 174.8
[97, 100] (1.9) [94, 98] (2.1) [104, 111] (2.9)
White 106 184.0 102 183.0 115 187.1
[103, 108] (2.1) [100, 105] (2.3) [112, 119] (3.6)
Black 77 140.1 74 138.1 87 145.7
[75, 80] (3.0) [71, 77.4] (3.5) [81.9, 92] (4.8)
Hispanic 98 166.4 98 169.3 99 159.5
[93, 103] (4.6) [92, 104] (5.4) [90, 106] (6.4)
Table Notes:
-Sample includes workers hired between Jan 1999 and May 2000.
-Mean tenures include only completed spells (98% spells completed). Median tenures 
include complete and incomplete spells.  
-Standard errors in parentheses account for correlation between observations from the 
same site (1,363 sites total). 95 percent confidence intervals for medians given in 
brackets.
B. Employment Spell Duration (days)
Full Sample Non-Tested Hires Tested Hires
Table I. Race and Gender Characteristics of Tested and Non-Tested Hires
A. Frequencies
Full Sample Non-Tested Hires Tested HiresMean SD
All 0.000 1.000 23.2 24.8 52.0
White 0.064 0.996 20.9 24.5 54.6
Black -0.125 1.009 27.8 25.2 47.1
Hispanic -0.056 0.982 24.9 25.6 49.6
Male 0.019 0.955 24.4 24.3 51.3
Female -0.014 1.033 21.6 25.5 52.9
Mean SD
All 0.707 0.772 0.18 16.1 83.8
White 0.720 0.772 0.14 15.7 84.2
Black 0.667 0.777 0.39 16.4 83.2
Hispanic 0.695 0.768 0.13 17.3 82.6
Male 0.749 0.750 0.23 14.9 84.8
Female 0.657 0.788 0.13 17.4 82.5
Race/Sex % Hired Obs Decile % Hired Obs
1 0.07 19,473
All 8.95 189,067 2 0.06 20,038
3 3.96 18,803
White 10.16 113,354 4 5.65 18,774
Black 7.17 43,314 5 7.97 19,126
Hispanic 7.12 32,399 6 10.99 18,264
7 11.71 18,814
8 13.76 18,029
Male 8.59 106,948 9 16.14 19,491









Quartile 3 & 
4: 'Green'
Table Notes:
- N=189,067 applicants and 16,925 hires at 1,363 sites.
- Sample includes all applicants and hires between Aug 2000 and May 2001 at sites 
used in treatment sample.
- Test score sample is standardized with mean zero and unit variance.
Table II. Test Scores and Hire Rates by Race and Gender for Tested 
Applicant Subsample
C. Hire Rates by Applicant Group
By Race and Gender By Test Score Decile
A. Test Scores of Applicants (n = 189,067)
Percent in each category
B. Test Scores of Hires (n = 16,925)
Percent in each category
Quartile 1: 
'Red'(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
-0.192 -0.183 -0.125 -0.113 -0.113
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
-0.121 -0.148 -0.100 -0.093 -0.093
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
-0.044 -0.045 -0.052 -0.053 -0.053





State effects No Yes No No No
1,363 Site effects No No Yes Yes Yes
State trends No No No No Yes
R-squared 0.0070 0.0113 0.0265 0.0269 0.0277
Obs
Table III. The Relationship Between Applicant Characteristics 
and Test Scores




-Robust standard errors in parentheses account for correlation between 
observations from the same site (1,363 sites).
-Sample includes all applications from August 2000 through May 2001 at sites in 
treatment sample.
-All models include controls for the year-month of application and an 'other' race 
dummy variable to account for 25,621 applicants with other or unidentified race.
-Income and fraction non-white for stores and applicants are calculated using 
store zip codes merged to 2000 Census SF1 and SF3 files.
Male
Median income in 
applicant's zip code
Percent non-white in 
applicant's zip code
189,067(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
8.9 18.4 18.4 21.8 6.3 14.9 14.8 18.1
(4.5) (4.0) (4.0) (4.3) (5.1) (4.6) (4.6) (5.0)
-43.5 -25.9 -25.9 -25.8 -25.9 -25.8
(3.2) (3.5) (3.5) (3.5) (3.5) (3.5)
-17.5 -11.8 -11.8 -11.7 -11.8 -11.7
(4.4) (4.1) (4.1) (4.1) (4.1) (4.1)
-4.2 -2.0 -2.0 -1.9 -2.0 -1.9
(2.4) (2.4) (2.4) (2.4) (2.4) (2.4)
Site effects No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
State trends No No No No No Yes No No No Yes
R-squared 0.0112 0.1089 0.0049 0.1079 0.1094 0.1116
Table IV. OLS and IV Estimates of the Effect of Job Testing on the Job Spell Duration of Hires
OLS Estimates 2SLS Estimates
Dependent Variable: Length of Completed Employment Spell (days)
Table Notes:
-N=33,266
-Robust standard errors in parentheses account for correlation between observations from the same site 
hired under each screening method (testing or no testing).
-All models include controls for month-year of hire.
-Sample includes workers hired Jan 1999 through May 2000 at 1,363 sites.
-Instrument for worker receiving employment test in columns 7 - 10 is an indicator variable equal to one if 
site has begun testing.
Employment  
   test
Black
Hispanic
Male(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
39.2 40.3 36.5 36.4 36.2 40.9







-37.2 -36.6 -34.8 -34.2 -33.2 -33.8 -35.8 -34.9 -33.3
(4.0) (4.0) (4.1) (6.1) (6.0) (6.3) (6.0) (5.9) (6.2)
-9.9 -9.7 -8.2 -23.2 -22.9 -24.1 -25.7 -25.5 -24.7
(5.5) (5.5) (5.3) (7.0) (7.0) (7.1) (7.1) (7.1) (7.2)
-5.4 -5.5 -5.3 0.0 -0.7 -0.2 0.3 -0.5 -0.3
(2.8) (2.8) (2.8) (4.8) (4.8) (4.9) (4.8) (4.8) (4.8)
State effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State trends No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.0227 0.0257 0.0260 0.0257 0.0335 0.0343
N
Table V. The Relationship between Site-Level Mean Test Scores and Job Spell Duration of Hires
Dependent Variable: Length of Employment Spell (days)
Non-Tested Hires (OLS) Tested Hires (OLS) Tested Hires (2SLS)
Mean test score of 
applicants
Mean test score of 
hires
Log median income 
in store zip code




-Robust standard errors in parentheses account for correlation between observations from the same site (1,363 clusters)
-All models include dummies for gender, race, and year-month of hire. 
-Applicant test sample includes all applications submitted from June 2000 through May 2001 at treatment sites (189,067 
applicants total).
-Cross-store standard deviation of mean applicant scores and mean hire scores are 0.159 and 0.315 respectively.




25,039(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
13.8 19.7 23.2 12.3 17.0 20.4
(5.0) (4.6) (4.8) (5.7) (5.2) (5.6)
15.4 22.2 23.2 12.4 18.1 18.8
(6.4) (5.9) (6.0) (7.0) (6.7) (6.9)
-1.2 7.0 12.8 -5.6 0.5 6.4
(8.8) (7.3) (7.6) (9.2) (7.7) (8.1)
-44.5 -26.5 -25.8 -44.0 -26.2 -25.4
(3.8) (3.9) (3.9) (3.9) (3.9) (3.9)
-14.0 -8.2 -8.8 -13.1 -7.2 -7.8
(5.5) (4.8) (4.9) (5.6) (4.9) (4.9)
-4.2 -2.0 -1.9 -4.2 -2.0 -1.9
(2.4) (2.4) (2.4) (2.4) (2.4) (2.4)
Site effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
State trends No No Yes No No Yes
H0: Race interactions 0.19 0.15 0.36 0.14 0.08 0.21
      jointly equal






-Robust standard errors in parentheses account for correlation between 
observations from the same site hired under each screening method (testing or 
no testing).
-All models include controls for month-year of hire.
-Sample includes workers hired Jan 1999 through May 2000 at 1,363 sites.
-Instrument for worker receiving employment test in columns 7 - 10 is an indicator 




Dependent Variable: Length of Completed Employment Spell (days)
Table VI. OLS and IV Estimates of the Effect of Job Testing on the Job 
Spell Duration of Hires: Testing for Differential Impacts by Race
2SLS Estimates
White x tested(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2.90 2.06 -2.35 -0.13 -2.48 -5.78
(5.63) (5.89) (6.77) (7.14) (7.33) (7.62)
State trends No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 30,921 23,957 26,982 26,982 22,453 22,453
0.41 0.24 -0.27 -0.04 -0.14 -0.21
(0.84) (0.89) (0.69) (0.72) (0.62) (0.67)
State trends No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 33,924 33,924 33,924 33,924 33,924 33,924
0.78 0.69 -0.15 0.09 -0.63 -0.78
(0.95) (1.02) (0.78) (0.81) (0.70) (0.77)
State trends No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 33,924 33,924 33,924 33,924 33,924 33,924
Table VII. Estimates of The Effect of Job Testing on Hiring Odds by Race (Panel A) and the 
the Share of Hires by Race (Panels B and C)
Dependent Variable:Equal to One (Zero) if Hired Worker is (not) of Specified Race
White Black Hispanic
Panel C. Hiring Shares: 100 x 2SLS Estimates
Employment test (2SLS 
coefficient)
Table Notes:
-Standard errors in parentheses. For OLS and IV models, robust standard errors in parentheses 
account for correlations between observations from the same site.  
-Sample includes workers hired Jan 1999 through May 2000.
-All models include controls for month-year of hire and site fixed effects.
-Fixed effects logit models discard sites where all hires are of one race or where relevant race is not 
present.
Panel A. Hiring odds: 100 x Fixed Effects Logit Estimates
Employment test (logit 
coefficient)
Panel B. Hiring Shares: 100 x OLS Estimates
Employment test (OLS 
coefficient)(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
All All All All All All
-87.4 -86.1 -87.6 56.5 56.7 56.5 30.9 29.4 31.2
(2.3) (3.4) (2.2) (3.5) (4.9) (3.3) (3.0) (4.4) (2.9)
1.3 -0.3 1.1 1.3 -2.4 -1.1
(3.3) (1.8) (4.9) (1.7) (4.5) (1.6)
Site effects No No No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes
State effects Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No
R-squared 0.232 0.253 0.236 0.353 0.169 0.197 0.174 0.356 0.130 0.110 0.124 0.296
N 25,561 8,363 33,924 33,924 25,561 8,363 33,924 33,924 25,561 8,363 33,924 33,924
32.0 39.5 32.2 -20.0 -23.0 -20.0 -12.1 -16.5 -12.3
(2.5) (3.1) (2.4) (2.5) (3.2) (2.4) (1.6) (2.5) (1.6)
5.9 0.6 -3.0 -0.4 -2.8 -0.3
(3.8) (1.6) (3.7) (1.4) (2.8) (1.2)
Site effects No No No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes
State effects Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No
R-squared 0.117 0.155 0.125 0.353 0.099 0.129 0.104 0.356 0.102 0.095 0.099 0.296
N 25,561 8,363 33,924 33,924 25,561 8,363 33,924 33,924 25,561 8,363 33,924 33,924
Dependent Variable: An Indicator Variable Equal to 100 if Worker is of Given Race
White Black Hispanic





Table VIII. The Relationship Between Store Zip Code Demographics and Race of Hires 








Panel B: Race of Hires and Log Median Income in Store Zip-Code
Log median 




-Robust standard errors in parentheses account for correlations between observations from the same site (pre or post 
use of employment testing in models where both included). 
-Sample includes workers hired Jan 1999 through May 2000.
-All models include controls for month-year of hire, and where indicated, 1,363 site fixed effects or state fixed effects.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Avg. ability W > B W > B W > B W = B W = B W = B
Interview bias Neutral Favors W Favors B Neutral Favors W Favors B
Test bias Neutral Neutral Neutral Favors W Favors W Favors W Observed
1. Initial tenure 52.0 30.1 80.7 -13.2 -41.9 15.6 44.9
  gap: W - B (5.1) (5.9) (5.0) (4.9) (5.1) (4.5) (3.9)
2. Δ W tenure 18.6 20.4 16.8 16.8 18.6 16.0 23.2
(1.2) (1.1) (1.3) (1.3) (1.2) (1.3) (4.8)
3. Δ B tenure 19.9 19.7 23.1 23.2 20.0 27.3 23.2
(2.7) (3.2) (2.3) (2.3) (2.7) (2.1) (6.0)
4. Δ W - Δ B -1.4 0.7 -6.3 -6.4 -1.4 -11.3 0.0
tenure (3.0) (3.4) (2.7) (2.7) (3.0) (2.6) (6.2)
5. χ
2(3) rows 1, 2, 3  2.4 5.1 34.0 88.1 185.5 26.6
  P-value 0.50 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
6. ΔW emp -0.97 -2.38 0.86 0.86 -0.98 2.69 0.24
  share x 100 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.89)
7. ΔB emp 0.82 1.72 -0.53 -0.53 0.82 -1.88 -0.04
  share x 100 (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.72)
8. ΔW - ΔB emp -1.79 -4.10 1.39 1.39 -1.79 4.57 0.28
  share x 100 (0.31) (0.30) (0.31) (0.30) (0.31) (0.32) (1.42)
9. χ
2(2) rows 6, 7 3.4 14.9 1.0 1.0 3.4 15.0
  P-value 0.33 0.00 0.79 0.79 0.33 0.00
10. χ
2(5) rows 5, 9 5.8 20.0 35.0 89.2 188.9 41.6
  P-value 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table IX. The Impact of Job Testing on Hiring and Job Spell Durations of White and Black 
Applicants under Six Bias Scenarios: Comparing Simulation Results with Observed Outcomes. 
Simulation Results
 A. Productivity: Job Spell Durations in Days
B. Employment Shares and Log Odds of Hiring
C. Omnibus Goodness of Fit Statistics for Productivity and Employment
Notes:
- 1,000 replications of each of six scenarios (corresponding to columns 1 through 6) using 189,067 
applicant files.
- In columns 1 through 6, standard deviations of estimates from 1,000 simulations are in 
parentheses. 
- In column 7, standard errors from empirical estimates are in parentheses.
- Point estimates and standard errors for results in column 7 are obtained from Tables I, V and VII.
- Chi-squared goodness of fit statistics are obtained by comparing simulation estimates in columns 1 
through 6 to observed outcomes in column 7.Figure I. Conditional Probability of Hire as a Function of Test Score by Race: 
Locally Weighted Regressions. Sample: All White, Black and Hispanic applicants, June 2000 -
May 2001 (n=189,067).Figure II. Density of Applicant Test Scores
Sample: All White, Black and Hispanic applicants, June 2000 - May 2001 (n=189,067)
A. White and Black Applicants
B. White and Hispanic ApplicantsFigure III. 
Simulation of the Impact of Job Testing on the Hiring and Productivity Gaps between Minority and Non-
Minority Workers under Two Screening Scenarios: (A) Interviews and Job Tests are Unbiased; (B) Interviews 
Favor Minorities, Job Test is Unbiased. 
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Hire Probality: Majority Applicants Hire Probability: Minority Applicants
Expected Productivity: Majority Hires Expected Productivity: Minority HiresFigure III note. 
In the simulation, nine percent of applicants are hired, the productivity (equivalently ability) of majority 
applicants is distributed N(0,0.27), the productivity of minority applicants is distributed N(-0.19,0.27), the 
precision of the interview signal is 1/0.45 and the precision of the job test ranges from 1/10,000 to 
1/0.0001 corresponding to a correlation between test scores and applicant ability of (0,1). These values are 
chosen to match estimates from the parametric simulation of the model in Section 6 of the text. In panel 
(A), both interviews and tests are mean-consistent with true applicant ability. In panel (B), the job test is 
mean-consistent with the true applicant ability and interviews are mean-biased in favor of minority 
applicants by +0.19. Figure IV. Completed Job Spell Durations of Tested and Non-Tested Hires.
Sample: Hires June 2000 - May 2001 with Valid Outcome Data (n=33,266)
A. Probability density
B. Cumulative distributionFigure V. Test Score Densities of Hired Workers by Race